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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
DE NOVO REVIEW OF INFORMAL PROCEDURES
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
The discretionary and informal procedures employed by the Comp-
troller of the Currency in processing bank and branch bank charter appli-
cations' have received a considerable amount of praise.2 What criticism
there has been has centered primarily upon the uncontrolled nature of
much of the Comptroller's discretion,3 and in recent years the Comptrol-
ler's office has moved decisively to remedy procedural inadequacies.4
These efforts have, for the most part, met with approval in commentaries'
'See generally Bloom, Hearing Procedures of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 723 (1966).
2Professor Davis has stated:
Probably the outstanding example in the federal government of regulation
of an entire industry through methods of supervision, and almost entirely
without formal adjudication, is the regulation of national banks. . . .The
system may be one of the most successful, if not the most successful.
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04 (1958). This observation has been
echoed by federal courts which have quoted Professor Davis. See, e.g., United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 330 (1963); Bridgeport Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 307 F.2d 580, 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
950 (1963); Northwest Bancorporation v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 303 F.2d
832, 843 (8th Cir. 1962).
'Prior to 1965, but only occasionally since then, the Comptroller passed upon applica-
tions without the benefit of either public or private hearings. Decisions were based upon
confidential evidence gathered by the field examiner which was kept secret from the inter-
ested parties. While parties could submit evidence to the field examiner, the confidentiality
of the evidence prevented rebuttal. Applicants were merely advised of the Comptroller's
decision without receiving a systematic statement of reasons or enlightenment as to findings
of fact. During 1965-66, Professor Davis conducted a study of the Comptroller's procedural
practices and criticized them as presenting possible due process violations. See Davis,
Administrative Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.'713
(1966). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.16 (Supp. 1970).
'Subsequent to Professor Davis' criticisms and the Fourth Circuit's decision in First
Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (1965), Comptroller Saxon instituted the
first reforms in the Comptroller's office in its one hundred year history. The Comptroller
now opens his evidentiary files for the inspection of the parties, conducts formal hearings
at the request of an interested party in contested cases, issues written opinions in contested
cases, and, where the application is denied, provides a brief statement of reasons for the
denial. Bloom, Hearing Procedures of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 723 (1966). Mr. Bloom, who was Chief Counsel for the Office of
the Comptroller, stated that these reforms were partially in response to Professor Davis'
findings. Professor Davis has suggested that the reforms might have been a response to the
sweeping review imposed by the Fourth Circuit in First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon,
352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965). K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.16 (Supp.
1970).
5See Davis, Banking Agencies' Secrecy: A Response to Mr. Bloom, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 731 (1966); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 4.04 (3d ed. 1972).
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and court decisions.6
However, it has been primarily within the last ten years, while the
Office of the Comptroller has been responding to the observations of its
critics, that a large body of case law has developed around the Comptrol-
ler's informal procedures. 7 In one of the early cases of this period, First
National Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon," the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, expressing great concern that due process elements of fairness
were not being extended to interested parties, formulated a new remedy
for complainants.' The Smithfield holding has been summarized as essen-
tially providing that
[t]he Comptroller is not required to hold a hearing on an applica-
tion, but unless he does hold an adversary hearing, a protestant is
entitled to a determination de novo in court. 0
'See, e.g., Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 925 (1971); Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
828 (1970); Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968); Citizens Bank v. Camp,
387 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Webster Groves Trust Co.
v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
7See Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
925 (1971); Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828
(1970); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 409 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1969); Warren
Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968); Citizens Bank v. Camp, 387 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d
283 (6th Cir. 1967); Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1966); First
Hardin Nat'l Bank v. Fort Knox Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank
of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965); Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon,
310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962); Wood County Bank v. Camp, 348 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C.
1972); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 317 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Md. 1970); Bank of Haw River
v. Saxon, 257 F. Supp. 74 (M.D.N.C. 1966); Bank of Sussex County v. Saxon, 251 F. Supp.
132 (D.N.J. 1966).
1352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
'Id. at 271, 273.
"Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 317 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Md. 1970). To date, this
appears to be the clearest and most concise enunciation of the Smithfield remedy. In
Smithfield. the Fourth Circuit stated:
Procedural due process is not offended by the Comptroller's practice. The
absence of a hearing provision in the Banking Act raises no Constitutional
question, for the omission was within the power of Congress. . . .How-
ever, all apprehension is dissipated by the APA's grant in § 1009 of a
review of the Comptroller's decision in the District Court to any party in
interest.
For the court review no evidential record need first be developed
before the Comptroller. No such prerequisite is exacted by the APA;
plainly it envisions instances where the evidence initially is to be taken in
a suit reexamining the agency action. To this end the Act gives the court
jurisdiction to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action ...found to
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
For seven years the Fourth Circuit had no occasion to reapply the
Smithfield remedy, and since other circuits had refused to apply it," the
formulation was thought to be either moribund or of dubious validity.'2
However, in the recent decision of Pitts v. Camp,3 the vitality of the
Smithfield formulation was re-established within the Fourth Circuit.
In Pitts, the plaintiffs had applied to the Comptroller of the Currency
in August, 1967, for a charter for the organization of The First National
Bank of Hartsville, South Carolina. 4 The Comptroller's regional field
examiner investigated the applicants, the community, and other inter-
ested parties and held several informal conferences with the applicants.'
A formal hearing was not requested by the applicants or any other party,
and none was held. On April 15, 1968, the applicants' attorney was
notified by letter and by telegram from the Comptroller that the charter
request had been denied, but no explanation of the denial was given. 6
be . . . unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo ... " § 1009(e)(6). Nothing in the statute precludes the
court from discovering the facts for the first time.
352 F.2d at 270-71. For other examples of attempts to summarize the Smithfield
formulation, see First-Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Camp, 409 F.2d 1086, 1094 (4th Cir.
1969); Bank of Haw River v. Saxon, 257 F. Supp. 74,79 (M.D.N.C. 1966); Bank of Sussex
County v. Saxon, 251 F. Supp. 132, 142-43 (D.N.J. 1966).
1 See Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828
(1970); Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968); Citizens Bank v. Camp, 387
F.2d 375, 376 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Webster Groves Trust Co.
v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
"In reference to Smithfield, Professor Davis notes:
The authoritative effect of the case today, if any, is weak, for three rea-
sons: (I) The later decisions of the 5th, 6th, and 8th circuits are unanimous
and clear in holding that de novo review is not required. (2) The dissenting
opinion of Judge Sobeloff in the Smithfield case was especially powerful;
the decision was two to one. (3) The comptroller's failure to disclose to
the competing bank the application and supporting data may have influ-
enced the decision.
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 122 n.36 (1969).
13463 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1972).
"Authority to charter national banking organizations has been delegated by Congress
to the Comptrollet of the Currency under the provisions of the National Bank Act §§ 21-
27, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-27 (1970).
"The Comptroller, or "a special commission appointed by him", is authorized to
conduct such investigations "for the purpose of inquiring into the condition of such associa-
tion." Id. at § 27.
"The applicants were informed as follows:
Dear Mr. Herring:
This will confirm our telegram of today's date regarding the applica-
tion submitted by you and your associates to organize a National Bank
at Hartsville, South Carolina.
On the basig of information developed by our Field Investigation,
19731
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Upon a request to the Comptroller for reconsideration, the field examiner
undertook a new investigation; informal conferences with the applicants
were held again, and the field examiner was supplied with additional data
from the interested parties. Once again, on July 29, 1969, the application
was rejected by the Comptroller. This time, however, the applicants were
notified that the Comptroller was "unable to reach a favorable conclusion
as to the need factor."'1
7
together with all other pertinent data relating to the proposal, we have
concluded that the factors in support of the establishment of a new Na-
tional Bank in this area are not favorable.
We regret to inform you that the application has been disapproved.
463 F.2d at 633.
"7This notification provided:
We have carefully considered the various material developed in
connection with the reconsideration of an application for a new National
Bank at Hartsville, South Carolina, filed by you and your associates. This
review included all of the material submitted by you at various times since
the disapproval of the application in April of 1968, as well as the material
developed during the course of the most recent field investigation by a
National Bank Examiner.
You and the members of the group would be less than human not to
feel strongly on this question which is of such importance to you. On each
application we endeavor to develop the need and convenience factors in
conjunction with all other banking factors and in this case we were unable
to reach a favorable conclusion as to the need factor. The record reflects
that this market area is now served by the Peoples Bank with deposits of
$7.2MM, The Bank of Hartsville with deposits of S12.8MM, The First
Federal Savings and Loan Association with deposits of $5.4MM, The
Mutual Savings and Loan Association with deposits of $8.2MM and the
Sonoco Employees Credit Union with deposits of $6.5MM. The aforemen-
tioned are as of December 31, 1968.
It was a difficult case and you and your associates certainly presented
your side of the case with fairness and diligence. We are unable to find
any basis to change the decision as rendered. All we can say to you is that
we did give this matter the most meticulous consideration and reached a
conclusion contrary to what you had sought.
Id. at 633-34.
The imprecise terminology employed by the Comptroller in speaking of the "need
factor" was a source of confusion to the Fourth Circuit on appeal, It seems to be well settled
that the need of the community is a factor which the Comptroller may consider when
processing bank charter applications. However, despite the Comptroller's recitation of the
bank deposits of the community, the Fourth Circuit found considerable ambiguity in inter-
preting the meaning of the "need factor":
Questions immediately arising are, for example, whether the need is that
of corporate or individual borrowers, local or non-resident depositors,
mercantile or development capital, or the creation of desirable competi-
tion. Reasonably imaginable are other areas of pertinent consideration,
untouched in the Comptroller's communications.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The plaintiffs appealed to the district court for a writ of mandamus."s
After admitting the administrative file on the application into the record,
the Comptroller moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion, reasoning that the plaintiffs' right to a trial de novo
under the Smithfield formulation had been waived by their failure to
request a formal hearing before the field examiner. 9 Basing its decision
on the information contained in the administrative file and seeking solely
to determine whether the Comptroller's denial was an abuse of his discre-
tion, the court held that the need factor was within the peculiar compe-
tence of the Comptroller and that his rejection of the application "was
neither capricious nor arbitrary.
'2
A unanimous decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the judgment of the district court.' The court discussed neither the sepa-
rate assignments of error ascribed to the district court by the appellants
nor the district court's finding that the appellants had waived their right
to a trial de novo. Rather, the court held that it was impossible to deter-
mine if the Comptroller's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion, because his ruling did not sufficiently state the reasons for
the denial. Noting that "the Comptroller has twice inadequately and
inarticulately resolved the appellant's presentation", 2 the court re-
manded the case to the district court, rather than to the Comptroller, for
a trial de novo2 to'determine whether, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the Comptroller's ruling was "capricious or an abuse of discre-
tion."24
In Pitts, the Fourth Circuit found itself presented with the same issues
as in Smithfield, although the Smithfield decision was broader in scope. 25
Id. at 634. Thus, in view of the Fourth Circuit's observations it is possible to conclude that
the "need factor" has no single definition, but takes its shape from whatever considerations
the Comptroller deems significant in a particular set of facts.
"321 F. Supp. 407 (D.S.C. 1970). A motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter was denied, the court reasoning that it did have jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Section 10(a) provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
1329 F. Supp. 1302, 1304-05 (D.S.C. 1970).
2Id. at 1307-08.
21463 F.2d at 632.
2id. at 634.
2It is interesting to note that Judge Bryan wrote the opinions in both Pitts and
Smithfield, the latter being the only authority cited in support of the remedy applied in the
former.
214463 F.2d at 634.
2In Smithfield, the Fourth Circuit also addressed the questions of whether there was
a requirement for the Comptroller to hold a formal hearing and whether there was a right
to judicial review. The court concluded that the provisions of the National Bank Act were
1973]
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The plaintiff in Smithfield was a North Carolina bank which was ad-
versely affected by the decision of the Comptroller to award a license to
a competitor bank for a branch office in the same village where plaintiff's
main office was located. The approval of the application was unaccom-
panied by a statement of reasons. Although the plaintiff bank had been
granted a conference with the Comptroller prior to the approval of the
license, it was not permitted to inspect the application or the investigative
file, or to cross-examine the applicants. Following an adverse ruling in
the district court, 26 the complaining bank appealed to the Fourth Cir-
cuity requesting a remand to the Comptroller with instructions to con-
duct a formal hearing on the application. While denying the appellant's
request for a formal hearing, the Fourth Circuit did agree that the bank
was entitled to judicial review of the Comptroller's decision.2 s Basing its
decision on section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,2 the court
remanded the case to the district court for a trial de novo in order to




An analysis of the decision in Pitts is necessarily twofold. The applica-
tion of the Smithfield remedy of de novo review must first be evaluated
in terms of its present statutory foundation. If the remedy is statutorily
permissible, it must then be considered in the broader context of its
effectiveness and desirability.
sufficiently broad to allow the informal procedures employed, but that the courts had ample
authority to review the Comptroller's actions under section 10(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 352 F.2d at 269-70.
26232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
2352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
21d. at 269.
21Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), ch. 324, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), as
amended 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
°An important corollary to the ruling for a trial de novo prescribes a different stan-
dard of evidence in review of informal procedures than in judicial review of formal hearings.
Noting that the burden upon the agency in review of its decisions is customarily to support
the decision with substantial evidence, the Fourth Circuit held:
[A] necessary consequence of his unilateral procedure is that the facts on
which the Comptroller presumably acted should not be given the preferred
position accorded by the substantial-evidence rule. . . . Applied here, the
plaintiff would be bound by evidence offered in a proceeding in which it
was not heard. Hence, there is no place in the review for an opening-
presumption of correctness of any fact which it may appear to the Court
was adopted by the Comptroller for his decision.
352 F.2d at 272. Cf 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Basis of Authority for De Novo Review
Judicial review of administrative action may range in scope from
nonreviewability to complete substitution of judicial judgment on all
questions.3 De novo review is a form of review close to the latter ex-
treme. 32 Originally courts would not undertake a de novo review without
a specific independent statutory or constitutional basis, since article III
of the Constitution was thought to prohibit the exercise of an administra-
tive function by the judiciary.3 The degree of review which could be
exercised under the name of de novo review, therefore, was determined
by the particular statutory or constitutional basis upon which the court
relied. It would appear, however, that de novo review always contem-
plates a broader review of evidence than that employed under the fre-
quently applied substantial evidence rule,34 because the reviewing court
itself hears the evidence and makes its own findings of fact.35
There is not a specific, independent, statutory provision which pro-
vides for any form of judicial review of the actions of the Comptroller of
the Currency.36 However, section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure
Act provides for de novo review of some administrative actions across the
broad range of administrative practice to which that act applies.37 Rely-
ing upon this statutory grant of authority, the court in Pitts ordered a de
novo review by the district court to include the submission of all relevant
evidence from the appellants, the Comptroller, and any intervenors. Act-
ing upon this evidence, the district court will make its own findings of fact
and conclusions of law in deciding whether the appellants have shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the Comptroller's ruling was capri-
cious or an abuse of discretion.3 1
Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act grants reviewing
courts limited authority to undertake review by trial de novo. That sec-
tion provides in part:
314 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
321d. at §§ 29.01, 29.07.
13d. § 29.10; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 620-23
(1965).
314 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07 (1958). See also note 30 supra.
34 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07 (1958).
31lndeed, the Comptroller has customarily argued that his actions are immune from
judicial review under § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act which denies review
under that act where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) (1970). This was the Comptroller's argument before the Fourth Circuit in Pitts.
Brief for Appellee at 9-17, Pitts v. Camp, 463 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972). It does not appear
that this contention has ever been upheld.
1'See text accompanying note 39 infra.
u463 F.2d at 634.
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To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the mean-
ing or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be. . . (F) unwarranted by the
facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.3 9
While this section might seem to apply only in conjunction with a specific
statutory grant of authority for de novo review, the legislative history of
the Administrative Procedure Act 0 indicates that the Congress envi-
sioned this provision by itself as a direct source of authority for the
application of de novo review:
The sixth category expresses the . . . situation in which Congress
has not provided by statute for an administrative hearing and
consequently any relevant facts must be presented de novo to origi-
nal courts of review . . . . It should be noted that the sixth cate-
gory, in accordance with the established rule, would permit trial
de novo to establish the relevant facts as to the applicability...
of adjudications where there is no statutory administrative hear-
ing.
41
Insofar as an administrative hearing is not required by statute, 2 it would
395 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
'IS. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., (1946).
"Id. at 39-40.
"2National Bank Act § 27, 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1970), provides in part:
If, upon a careful examination of the facts so reported, and of any other
facts which may come to the knowledge of the comptroller, whether by
means of a special commission appointed by him for the purpose of inquir-
ing into the condition of such association, or otherwise, it appears that
such association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of banking,
the comptroller shall give to such association a certificate. . . . But the
comptroller may withhold from an association his certificate authorizing
the commencement of business, whenever he has reason to suppose that
the shareholders have formed the same for any other than the legitimate
objects contemplated by this chapter.
No mention is made in the statute of an administrative hearing and the terminology would
appear to encourage informal procedures. The courts have interpreted this section liberally
as granting the Comptroller broad discretion in both the procedural and substantive aspects
of decision-making. See Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971); Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333, 341 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52, 55-56 (6th Cir. 1968);
Citizens Bank v. Camp, 387 F.2d 375, 376 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968);
Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
seem that the Comptroller's inforrhal procedures fall directly within the
scope of section 10(e)2(F). In addition, it should be noted that those
courts which have refused to order de novo review, when requested to do
so, never stated or implied that they lacked statutory authority. 3
A recent decision of the Supreme Court, however, has considerably
restricted the range of cases in which de novo review may be imposed.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,44 the Court reasoned
that section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act45 authorizes de
novo review to determine whether administrative action was unwarranted
by the facts in only two circumstances." First, the Court would approve
de novo review of administrative action when the action "is adjudicatory
in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate."47 Sec-
ond, trial de novo would be appropriate for review of nonadjudicatory
(legislative or rule-making) action "when issues that were not before the
agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce . . . agency action."4
In view of the Overton Park decision, de novo review of the Comptrol-
ler's informal hearing procedures would seem to be permitted only if the
Comptroller's factfinding procedures were found to be inadequate, for it
seems reasonably clear that the decision regarding bank charter applica-
tions is adjudicatory in nature.49 It would appear that the restrictions
imposed by Overton Park upon de novo review should be applicable in
Pitts, although the Fourth Circuit seems to have justified the remedy
solely on the basis of Smithfield without considering the possible effects
that Overton Park may have had upon its earlier holding. Therefore, it
becomes necessary to determine whether the Fourth Circuit's application
of de novo review is consistent with the guidelines announced in Overton
Park.
Although the court in Pitts did not speak to the sufficiency of the
Comptroller's factfinding procedures, previous Fourth Circuit decisions
in Smithfield and First-Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. Camp" provide
of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1965). See also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04 (1958).
3See, e.g., Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828
(1970); Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968); Citizens Bank v. Camp, 387
F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Webster Groves Trust Co. v.
Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
44401 U.S. 402 (1971).
455 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
41401 U.S. at 415.
"Ild.
4 First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1965); Wood
County Bank v. Camp, 348 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (D.D.C. 1972); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 4.04, 4.11 (1958).
-409 F.2d 1086 (1969).
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some guidance. In both cases, the court held that the Comptroller was
authorized to decide bank and branch bank charter applications upon the
basis of informal procedures, but that the Comptroller's failure to provide
for a confrontation of adverse parties and an opportunity for rebuttal
might offend due process notions of fairness.5' While this may be a valid
objection as to the fairness of the Comptroller's factfinding procedures,
it would not seem to be an objection to the adequacy of those procedures.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand how there could be any such objection
in light of repeated judicial observations,5 2 including the Smithfield,3 and
First-Citizens4 decisions, that the Comptroller's informal decision-
making process is, by nature, free of the rigors of factfinding in a formal
hearing, and that the process is adequate. It has even been suggested that
the Comptroller's informal procedures are more effective and better
suited for the resolution of banking questions than formal hearings. 5s
Thus, it would seem that the Fourth Circuit considers the Comptrol-
ler's factfinding procedures to be unfair to the interested parties when
formal hearings are not held but recognizes the legal sufficiency of the
procedures in any event. However, the Overton Park guidelines speak in
terms of factfinding inadequacy, not due process unfairness. While
Overton Park did not define inadequacy, the Court noted that "such de
novo review is authorized where the action is adjudicatory in nature and
the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate."56 The context of the
statement also indicates that "inadequacy" modifies "factfinding": the
Court was generally speaking of de novo review of administrative actions
which are "unwarranted by the facts", not of actions which violate due
process notions of fairness.57 Hence it would seem that due process unfair-
511d. at 1090.
2See note 42 supra.
11352 F.2d at 270.
11409 F.2d at 1089-90.
53See note 2 supra; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE, MONOGRAPH ON FEDERAL CONTROL OF BANKING, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess., Part 14 30 (1940). The Attorney General's Committee's report, which was relied
upon by Congress in the drafting of the Administrative Procedure Act, (see S. REP. No.
752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., (1946)), was skeptical of the need for formal hearings:
Nor is it proposed that the Comptroller must, in passing upon appli-
cations to organize banks, go through the motions of a formal hear-
ing. . . . [T~he investigative technique now in use is probably superior to
the device of formal hearings as a method of obtaining necessary informa-
tion, preliminary to decision. So long as opportunities for informal confer-
ence are freely given, and so long as machinery for securing reconsidera-
tion is provided, the restrictions of a formal hearing are not necessary to
assure that applicants will be fairly heard.
56401 U.S. at 415.
571d.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
ness does not warrant de novo review where agency factfinding proce-
dures are adequate, as the Comptroller's procedures would appear to be.
The Fourth Circuit is apparently guaranteeing interested parties a
formal hearing, either by request at the administrative level or by trial
de novo at the appellate level. The premise would seem to be that formal
hearings are more adequate factfinding vehicles than the Comptroller's
informal procedures, a premise in direct conflict with the observations of
prominent authorities."
Since the other circuits have concluded that the Comptroller's infor-
mal procedures are adequate, a conclusion the Fourth Circuit has
adopted in Smithfield and First-Citizens, the Fourth Circuit would seem
to be imposing de novo review to provide what it considers to be fairer
factfinding procedures, rather than to correct inadequate procedures. If
such a policy for the imposition of de novo review does not exceed the
authority of the courts as explained in the Overton Park decision, it seems
to border upon the limits of that authority.
Even if the court in Pitts was acting within the limits of its authority
in ordering a de novo review, the question of the desirability of such a
review still remains. It is upon this consideration that the Fourth Circuit
seems to depart from the decisions of other circuits which, in general,
have refused to review the Comptroller's informal procedures by trials de
novo.
The Desirability of De Novo Review
The decisions of the four other circuits which have ruled on the appli-
cation of de novo review to decisions of the Comptroller indicate that it
is simply regarded as an inappropriate form of relief for the review of the
informal procedures. The first two circuits to consider the issue, the
Eighth" and the Fifth,60 treated the matter in cursory fashion."1 However,
the more recent Sixth Circuit decision in Warren Bank v. Camp," which
has been followed in the Third Circuit,63 treats the question of de novo
review in greater detail.
-'See notes 2 & 55 supra.
5"Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
"Citizens Bank v. Camp, 387 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904
(1968).
61Following a discussion of the broad discretionary powers enjoyed by the Comptroller,
the courts simply stated that the actions of the Comptroller were not subject to review by
trial de novo. Although no explanation was provided, it appears that the courts may have
felt that a de novo review would infringe upon the Comptroller's discretion. 370 F.2d at
387; 387 F.2d at 376.
6396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968).
63Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
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In Warren Bank, the court observed that although the Comptroller
has considerable discretion which may not be reversed unless arbitrarily
or capriciously applied, the district courts also have considerable discre-
tion in determining the degree of scrutiny they may attach to a review of
the administrative action, since judicial review of administrative action
ranges from no review at all to a full-scale trial on the merits.64 In Warren
Bank, the court did not suggest that de novo review was beyond the
court's discretion; it stated only that "[t]here appears . . . to be general
agreement that a trial de novo is not required for every complaint where
abuse of administrative discretion is pled."6"
The argument that de novo review is not necessarily the most appro-
priate form of review seems implicit in the opening clause of section 10(e)
of the Administrative Procedure Act, which directs a reviewing court to
undertake a review "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when pre-
sented."66 In limiting the scope of review to the extent necessary to deci-
sion, Congress seems to have envisioned instances in which a statutorily
valid trial de novo would be far too vigorous in light of the objections
raised to the administrative action. It would appear that the provision
regarding de novo review67 is not a matter of right, but a means of
implementing the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act6" in situations where any degree of judicial review would other-
wise be impossible. 9
The decisions of the Fourth Circuit providing for de novo review
whenever the Comptroller fails to hold a formal hearing place the district
court in a peculiar situation. Upon remand, the district court will be faced
with the problem of determining whether a decision is arbitrary without
a statement of reasons for that decision. The review ordered in Pitts
contemplates that the district court will make its own findings of fact
following the presentation of evidence by all parties. 6 In essence, this
"See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
65396 F.2d at 56.
165 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). The original wording before amendment in 1966 was: "So far
as necessary to decision and where presented .... Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e),
ch. 324, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946). This was the language in effect at the time of the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Smithfield.
"Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
"Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
"For example, the reviewing court would be warranted in undertaking a de novo review
where the factfinding procedures were inadequate and the decision of the administrative
agency was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious. In such a case, the court would be unable
to review the decision for lack of an adequate evidential record. The reviewing court would
therefore be forced to ma1 "' its own findings of fact in order to grant relief. See Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07 (1958).
11463 F.2d at 634.
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procedure will force the reviewing court to analyze the result of the
administrative action rather than the specific reasons upon which the
agency relied. Thus, the district court may affirm the action on reasoning
other than that followed by the Comptroller or it may reverse the action
emphasizing different facts. In either case, the court will be substituting
its own discretion for that of the Comptroller. The ramifications of this
problem have been previously considered by the Supreme Court, al-
though in a slightly different context.
In its two decisions in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,71 the Supreme Court
stated what have become cardinal rules of judicial review of administra-
tive agency decision-making.2 The primary rule states that the reviewing
court cannot intrude upon the domain of the agency and substitute its
discretion for that of the agency.73 The courts may not reverse agency
judgments simply because they might have made a different determina-
tion;74 they may only affirm or reverse as to the legality of the agency
decision, and if they affirm they may only affirm upon the rationale
invoked by the agency.75 This reasoning recognizes the concept of separa-
tion of powers and the view that the judiciary should not intrude upon
the functions Congress has delegated to the administrative agency be-
cause of the agency's special expertise and experience.
71
The application of this rule, of course, requires that the rationale of
the administrative agency be clearly stated. This is the corollary to the
primary Chenery rule. In the second Chenery decision, the Court noted:
If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which
it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity
as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled
to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action; nor can a
court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what
the agency has left vague and indecisive. In other words, "We must
know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say
whether it is right or wrong."
77
The Fourth Circuit in Pitts cited this rule from Chenery as justification
71318 U.S. 80 (1943); 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
nSee K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.12 (Supp. 1970).
"318 U.S. at 88. It must be remembered that the Chenery cases were decided in 1943
and 1947, respectively. The rules of those cases were "simple but fundamental rule[s] of
administrative law" and, therefore, of general applicability. 332 U.S. at 196. It would
appear that where specific statutory or Supreme Court pronouncements call for a broader
or lesser degree of review, the Chenery rules would be held in abeyance.
11318 U.S. at 94.
751d. at 88.
7332 U.S. at 209.
"Id. at 196-97 (citation omitted).
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for refusing to review the district court's opinion. The court held that the
limited reasoning contained in the Comptroller's two letters of rejection
was insufficient to sustain the district court's review.
78
The vitality of the Chenery principles has been preserved through
subsequent Supreme Court decisions,'7 and these two rules have been
applied to review of the Comptroller of the Currency's informal adjudica-
tory procedures, although never with regard to bank applications." Nu-
merous circuit court statements to the effect that the Comptroller's deci-
sions must be upheld unless arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre-
tion,6 ' reflect the impact of the Chenery rules. While the Fourth Circuit
appears to agree that review must look to whether the administrative
action was arbitrary or capricious, the decisions ordering de novo review
would not seem to be in the spirit of the Chenery principles.
The imposition of de novo review in Smithfield and Pitts would seem
to imply a broader review than should be judicially undertaken. In Pitts,
the court described the de novo review in detail:
The charter aspirants will open the trial with proof of their appli-
cation and compliance with the statutory inquiries, and proffer of
any other relevant evidence. Testimony may then be adduced by
the Comptroller or intervenors manifesting opposition, if any, to
the new bank. Thereupon the District Judge will determine, upon
a statement of his findings of fact and conclusions of law, whether
the appellants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that the
Comptroller's ruling is capricious or an abuse of discretion.
8 2
Although the corollary Chenery rule states that a court may not guess
11463 F.2d at 633.
"'See, e.g., Port of Portland v. United States, 408 U.S. 811, 842 (1972); FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249 (1972); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 400 U.S. 932, 934 (1970) (White, J., dissenting); Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962).
'0See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The Supreme Court,
relying upon Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962), which had relied
upon Chenery, stated that judicial review of the Comptroller's action in granting authority
to national banks to operate collective investment funds could not be based upon post hoc
rationalizations by the Comptroller or his counsel. Accord, Wood County Bank v. Camp,
348 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (D.D.C. 1972).
"Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 925 (1971); Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 828 (1970); Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52, 56 (6th Cir. 1968); Citizens Bank v.
Camp, 387 F.2d 375, 376 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Webster Groves
Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1966); First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v.
Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 1965).
82463 F.2d at 634.
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at the administrative rationale, the Fourth Circuit's instructions do not
specifically call for a clarification of the Comptroller's decision, despite
the court's awareness that the Comptroller's decision was too vague upon
which to base a review. 3 The instructions provide only that "[tiestimony
may then be adduced ..."I' Therefore, unless the district court requests
some form of a preliminary clarification of the decision from the Comp-
troller, the de novo review can only proceed in ignorance of the rationale
of the administrative action.
The court's instructions to the district court do not direct, or even
seem to contemplate, a remand to the Comptroller for a further explana-
tion. Thus, it may be impossible for the district court to determine
whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious in terms of the Comp-
troller's original reasoning, because the district court may never under-
stand the reasoning underlying that decision. The rationale of the
Chenery principles seems to have been corrupted to the extent that the
reviewing court must evaluate the Comptroller's decision without the
benefit of a statement of reasons. The court may have to substitute its
own interpretation of the Comptroller's reasons to review the agency
decision. Such an interpretation by the court presents a problem because
the determination of whether the administrative action was arbitrary or
capricious can only be made in terms of the reasons relied upon by the
Comptroller, not merely in terms of the correctness of the result. In other
words, the Chenery decisions require a reason prior to the review, against
which evidence will be measured. The Fourth Circuit, however, has or-
dered a de novo review in Pitts without any provision for ascertaining the
Comptroller's reasons prior to the hearing.
Without a clarification of the administrative action by the Comptrol-
ler prior to trial, the Comptroller's reasons will not be fully presented to
the district court unless he offers testimony. Rationalizations of the bank
charter denial by others than the Comptroller will clearly not suffice
because the Supreme Court has been emphatic and persistent in declaring
that a court may not render a decision based upon the post hoc rationali-
zations of anyone other than the Comptroller."' While it seems probable
that the Comptroller will seek to defend his action before the district
court by adducing testimony, the Fourth Circuit's instructions do not
seem to require that he do so. The instructions merely state that the
lid. at 633-34.
"Id. at 634.
"See Port of Portland v. United States, 408 U.S. 811, 842 (1972); FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249 (1972); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
628 (1971); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971);
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
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Comptroller "may" adduce testimony. 6 Should such testimony be admit-
ted, it will come at a point in the hearing subsequent to the presentation
of the unsuccessful charter applicants' case.87 This sequence of testimony
will deny the applicants a focal point for their presentation of evidence
since a de novo trial, without a prior statement of reasons from the
Comptroller, will effectively prevent the applicants from challenging the
specific rationale of the Comptroller's decision.
The district court's de novo review seems likely to develop into a trial
on the merits because the court has been authorized to conduct a com-
pletely new factfinding investigation. It would seem that all that would
be necessary to determine the capriciousness of the Comptroller's deci-
sion would be to focus upon the reasonableness of the Comptroller's
evaluation of the vague "need factor". However, the district court is
authorized to receive "any . . .relevant evidence"8' 8 from the appellants,
opponents of the new bank, the Comptroller, or any intervenors."s
Since the Comptroller's decision should be judged only upon the ra-
tionale of the admittedly vague "need factor", any opposition unrelated
to that factor, as the Comptroller employed that term, would seem, as a
matter of policy, to be beyond the competence of the court to judge."0
Because the Comptroller claimed to have based his decision upon the
need factor, evidence not relevant to that particular factor would seem
to be irrelevant as grounds of support for his decision.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit appears to have specifically provided
for a review in which the district court will be allowed to consider any
8463 F.2d at 634.
"ld. The Fourth Circuit's instructions to the district court ordered that the trial open
with the presentation of evidence by the charter aspirants to be followed by testimony from
the Comptroller or intervenors. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
0 4 6 3 F.2d at 634.
891d.
"°These are the same concerns that led Judge Sobeloff to dissent in Smithfield. 352 F.2d
267, 273-77 (dissenting opinion). Judge Sobeloff perceived that unless the decision of the
Comptroller was clarified, the appellants would have a difficult time presenting their case
because the Comptroller's decision would almost certainly come before the district court
"clothed with a presumption of correctness," despite the majority's claims to the contrary.
Id. at 274. Judge Sobeloff explained:
The District Court is thus placed in the unhappy position of choosing
between two equally unacceptable alternatives. Either it must blindly as-
sume that the Comptroller's discretion rests upon an adequate basis in
fact, in which event the court review almost inevitably becomes a meaning-
less gesture; or the District Court, proceeding upon the basis of facts
independently determined by it, must act in ignorance of the nature of the
decision it is reviewing, in which case the court's judgment is liable to
usurp the Comptroller's function. We should not require or tolerate such
a game of "blind man's bluff".
Id. at 274.
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evidence in support of any reason to justify the result of the Comptroller's
decision to deny the bank charter. Therefore, instead of evaluating the
result of the Comptroller's decision in terms of a clealy articulated rea-
son, as directed by the Chenery decisions, the district court will be evalu-
ating the result, without a clearly articulated reason, in terms of the body
of evidence advanced by the parties at the trial de novo.
That the de novo review may possibly evolve into a trial on the merits
is disguised only by the fact that the district court is instructed to deter-
mine if the "Comptroller's ruling is capricious or an abuse of discre-
tion."'" However, such a determination appears to be an illusion unless
the district court conducts the type of pre-trial investigation of the Comp-
troller's rationale which the Fourth Circuit has not instructed it to under-
take. The broad evidentiary record which will be assembled before the
district court will increase the difficulty that the court will face in trying
to evaluate the capriciousness of the decision in light of the administrative
rationale.
In its attempt to ascertain the rationale of the Comptroller, the dis-
trict court may reverse the Comptroller because of its misunderstanding
of his rationale, or it may substitute its own judgment in affirming his
decision because it improperly interpreted his rationale while agreeing
with his holding. If either decision should be made, the court would be
violating the primary Chenery principle92 since it would be substituting
its discretion for that of the Comptroller. Chenery and its progeny de-
mand that an administrative decision be upheld only if the decision is
valid and can be supported by the specific reasoning upon which the
administrative agency relied.3
Even if the district court should correctly interpret the Comptroller's
decision, unless specifically authorized, the application of de novo review
would seem to violate the concept of separation of powers which underlies
the Chenery principles: the judiciary should not infringe upon the domain
of the administrative agency. 4 The de novo review in Pitts involves a
complete rehearing of the original application with the court making its
own findings of fact and conclusions of law and comparing them with the
decision of the administrative agency. 5 Yet the district court will be
making these findings of fact upon a broad range of evidence without the
benefit of the experience and expertise which the Comptroller presumably
possesses. 6
"463 F.2d at 634.
12318 U.S. at 88.
112 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.07 (1958, Supp. 1970).
11332 U.S. at 195.
11463 F.2d at 634. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
"E.g., Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 387-88 (8th Cir. 1966).
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In light of the totality of evidence which will be gathered, the unre-
stricted direction of the proceedings, and the vague meaning of the Comp-
troller's decision, the trial de novo will closely resemble the formal hear-
ing which the Comptroller, acting within the scope of his discretion, chose
not to conduct. It would seem to violate the principles of separation of
powers inherent in Chenery, section 10(e) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, and the statutory grant of authority to the Comptroller," for
the Fourth Circuit to provide for a review far beyond the scope necessary
to determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious. The
criticisms expressed about the efficacy of formal hearings in bank appli-
cation proceedings before the Comptroller98 seem to cast further doubt
upon the wisdom of such a proceeding when it is undertaken by the
district court.
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that de novo review was not the
most appropriate remedy for the Fourth Circuit to have applied in Pills.
However, as the Supreme Court observed in Overton Park, the fact that
de novo review is unwarranted does not mean that the reviewing court
may not engage in a "substantial inquiry". 9 Therefore, it becomes neces-
sary to determine what alternative remedies the Fourth Circuit might
have fashioned in Pitts in order to conduct a "substantial inquiry".
Alternatives to De Novo Review
It would appear that in both Pitts and Smithfield the Fourth Circuit
should first have made some attempt to ascertain the rationale upon
which the Comptroller rejected the appellants' charter applications. Such
an inquiry would have provided an adequate basis upon which the district
court might have undertaken a more limited review. There would seem
to be several remedies alternative to de novo review by which a clarifica-
tion of the Comptroller's reasoning might have been obtained.
A more appropriate remedy than the trial de novo in Pitts might have
been a remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the
Comptroller for further proceedings. The Comptroller might then have
furnished the district court with a clarification of his decision. The district
court would have been able to determine whether there existed a prima
facie case of abuse of discretion before conducting a hearing. If no prima
facie case could have been established, summary judgment would then
have been granted for the Comptroller on the basis of the administrative
file and the Comptroller's clarification,' and the difficulties of a de novo
'National Bank Act §§ 21-27, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-27 (1970).
"See note 55 supra.
"401 U.S. at 415.
"'Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52, 56"(6th Cir. 1968).
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hearing would have been avoided. Should the appellants have been able
to establish a prima facie case of abuse of discretion, the reviewing court
could have proceeded to a less extensive and more restricted review of the
specific rationale employed by the Comptroller.
Such a remand was the course advocated by Judge Sobeloff in his
vigorous dissent in Smithfield.' Remands to the administrative agency
have been a common remedy in administrative law since the Chenery
decisions.0 2 The Supreme Court in the first Chenery decision' ordered
the case remanded to the S.E.C. for a revised opinion after finding that
the written decision of the S.E.C. was incorrect in its reasoning although
the result might have been supported upon other grounds."4
Although the Chenery decisions referred to administrative actions
where formal hearings and written opinions were required, the Chenery
remedy is not inapplicable to review of the Comptroller's informal proce-
dures. Although the Administrative Procedure Act and the National
Bank Act do not require the issuance of written opinions in decisions
based upon informal discretionary procedures, section 6(d) of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act does require that the administrative officer in-
clude a brief statement of reasons when denying any written applica-
tion.105 Professor Davis points out that the Comptroller has apparently
been violating the Administrative Procedure Act for a number of years
by denying applications without stating reasons."' Although it has been
the Comptroller's policy in recent years to issue written opinions in con-
tested cases, 0 uncontested cases still fall within the ambit of the statute,
and a statement of reasons would still be required upon rejection of an
application.
The letters written by the Comptroller and sent to the appellants'
lawyer in Pitts would seem to violate the statute.0 8 The first letter,0 9
which should have stated the reasons for the denial, contained no sugges-
101352 F.2d 267, 273-76 (dissenting opinion).
1°2See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FPC v. United
Gas Pipe Line Co., 393 U.S. 71 (1968); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S.
156 (1962).
'318 U.S. 80 (1943).
' Id. at 95.
1-5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970) provides in part:
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written
application . . . made in connection with any agency proceeding. Except
in affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory, the
notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial.
t01K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 4.04 (3d ed. 1972).
107See note 5 supra.
'"The letters are reproduced in notes 16 and 17 supra.
See note 16 supra.
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tion as to the reason for the rejection of the application. The second
letter"0 provided only a passing reference to the "need factor" together
with some bank deposit amounts. This letter did not attempt to establish
any causal relationship between the bank deposits and the size of the
community, or its economy, or any other factor which the Comptroller
might have considered to establish the "need factor".
Regardless of whether the Comptroller's failure to state his reasons
clearly was a violation of section 6(d) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, it should be apparent that the remedy imposed in the first Chenery
decision might be applicable in cases like Pitts where there is a require-
ment of a statement of reasons, although not in the detail of a written
opinion. Professor Davis would require written opinions on all applica-
tion decisions as a matter of policy."' He notes that the inter-office
memos used by the Office of the Comptroller so closely resemble written
opinions that they could be reworked to fulfill that function with a mini-
mum of bother to the Comptroller."2 At the same time, the opinions
would serve as a curb upon the uncontrolled discretion of the Comptroller
and provide a more satisfactory basis for judicial review."
3
Had the Fourth Circuit desired a more expeditious disposition of the
case, it might have foregone a remand of the case to the Comptroller for
a written statement of reasons and ordered a review in the district court
with instructions to that court to obtain some further explanation from
the Comptroller during the pre-trial stages. In Overton Park, after decid-
ing that de novo review was not warranted but that the district court was
authorized to conduct a "substantial inquiry"," 4 the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the district court for review upon the administrative
record. Noting that the Secretary of Transportation's rationale might not
be disclosed in the administrative record, the Court stated that some
further explanation might be in order:
The court may require the administrative officials who partici-
pated in the decision to give testimony'explaining their action. Of
course, such inquiry into the mental processes of administrative
decisionmakers is usually to be avoided. . . . And where there are
administrative findings that were made at the same time as the
decision . . . there must be a strong showing of bad faith or im-
proper behavior before such inquiry may be made. But here there
'See note 17 supra.
"1K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 4.04 (3d ed. 1972).
"2Davis, Administrative Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 713, 718 (1966).
11K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 4.04 (3d ed. 1972).
"'1401 U.S. at 415.
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are no such formal findings and it may be that the only way there
can be effective judicial review is by examining the decisionmakers
themselves."'
The Court also noted that the Secretary might be able to provide written
formal findings which could explain the rationale."' In any event the
Court stated that the district court could use whatever method it thought
"most expeditious so that full review [might] be had as soon as possi-
ble."1
7
The advantages of a remand to the Comptroller for a written opinion,
or of a remand to the district court with instructions to obtain a further
clarification of the decision before proceeding further are readily appar-
ent. Either remedy would insure against judicial infringement upon the
domain of the Office of the Comptroller. It would inform the court of
the basis of the Comptroller's decision, which, in turn, would provide an
adequate basis for judicial review of that decision.
By remanding the case to the district court for a trial de novo, the
Fourth Circuit has revived what seems to be a questionable precedent.
The remedy imposed in Smithfield has been the subject of significant
criticism. It has been followed in only one district court decision outside
the Fourth Circuit"' and was subsequently rejected by the court of ap-
peals of that circuit."' Every other circuit which has faced the issue has
also rejected the Fourth Circuit's remedy. 2 Professor Davis has charac-
terized the dissent of Judge Sobeloff in Smithfield as "powerful"'' and
has labeled the authoritative effect of the case as weak or non-existent.
2 2
As yet, the Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari on the issue.'2
Until it does, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Pitts has insured that this
conflict between the circuits will continue and that the questionable rem-
edy of de novo review will be employed within the Fourth Circuit to





"'Bank of Sussex County v. Saxon, 251 F. Supp. 132 (D.N.J. 1966).
"'Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
'"Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968); Citizens Bank v. Camp, 387
F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Webster Groves Trust Co. v.
Saxon, 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
"'K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 122 n.36 (1969).
12id.
raThe Supreme Court has denied certiorari three times where circuit courts have
refused to order de novo review of the Comptroller's decisions on bank applications follow-
ing informal investigations. Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 431 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971); Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 828 (1970); Citizens Bank v. Camp, 387 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 904 (1968).
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